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I TliE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
. - -------------------------
· l .:;TE OF UTAH, 
,.,r• 1 ·r Al!CE SAUNDERS, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 19054 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, GARY VANCE SAUNDERS, appeals for 
tne sonviction of Burglary, a Second Degree Felony, in 
v1olation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended); 
lhPft, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann §76-6-404 (1953 as amended); Possession of a Firearm 
oy a Restricted Person, a Second Degree Felony, in violation 
•cr 1)tah Code Ann. §76-10-503(2) (1953 as amended); and 
b0 ing a Habitual Criminal, a First Degree Felony, in 
of Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1001 (1953 as amended). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, GARY VANCE SAUNDERS, was tried by 
Jt 28-29, 1982, before the Honorable James 
·1n1 found guilty of the Burglary, Theft, and 
1· a Firearm by a Restricted Person charges. 
On December 30, 1982, appellant was the 
Court and found guilty of tieing a Habitual C":t'iminal 
Appellant was sentenced to the Utah State Prisnn for 
an indeterminate term of 1 to years for the Burglary; 
1 to 15 years for the Theft; 1 to 15 years for the 
Possession of a Firearm, and 5 years to life for the 
Habitual Criminal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction and 
judgment rendered below or a remand of the case to the 
Third Judicial District Court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the early evening of April 23, 1982, a 
television set, microwave oven, two firearms, a rifle, 
a box of ammunition, and various items of jewelry were 
taken from the residence of Mr. and Mrs. Berry Phelps, 
1672 East 7000 South, Salt Lake City (T.18). Mrs. 
Phelps, whose husband was away for the weekend (T.13), 
was not at home the night of the 24th, having left 
in the day to stay with a daughter (T.14). One of the 
firearms and television set were subsequently recovered 
by the police (T. 52, 211). 
The :tate 1 s c8:,,_. '.N'1:-, tJCJ.si?,j upon th1:_· '.'f 
Stacy L'.:',-1+- n-l 'i 1:1 of 
Williams wh· 
t ' 1· his involvement in the burglary and theft 
7UOO South in return for his testimony 
·ring the incident (T.40-41, 67). Mr. Williams 
i-J that the appellant participated in both the 
t i; L3'':1 :,wi theft of the items from the Phelps residence 
cc;· :C°•:tlng the place (T.44), springing the lock (T.46), 
qqj ,;att1ering the items taken (T.49-50). Williams 
tJrther tPstified he stored the stolen items at the house 
t1is brother, Timmy Shunk (T.53) and also later sold 
guns to a fence, Amos Armijo, and the television 
individual, Marvin Powell (T.56, 57-58). Mr. 
Williams testified that Mr. Shunk's residence was their 
place" to store things (T.52), and that Mr. 
Arm1jr was "our fence" (T.53). 
Several officers testified to a multi-agency 
"1'''''2t1on that resulted in the recovery of items from 
.is burglary from Amos Armijo (T.75-104), and a resulting 
c'"'cmPnt from Stacy Williams (T.90-91). Appellant was 
with the Armijos (T.79-80) when they were attempting 
away with the merchandise. 
The appellant did not testify and counsel stipulated 
'·le' as a restricted person, incarcerated at the 
l'r·\ son and housed in a half-way house at the 
''·'· .ff"pn.se (T. 74). Prior to trial, counsel for 
: ! cicid•: ri motion to sever the count of Possession 
t; 3 Restricted Person which was denied by 
-3-
the Honorable Peter F. Leary on December 21, 19·'32. T\-:e 
Appellant presented evJ_,ience that. Timmy Shunk was iri fact 
in jail on April 24, 1';182, through two officers involved 
in keeping the records on inmates in the jail (T.112, 130). 
Subsequent to Appellant's conviction on the burglary, 
theft, and possession of firearm counts, the Court conducted 
a hearing on the habitual criminal charge. The State intro-
duced prior felony convictions and commitments (Exhibits 
7, 8, 9). Case No. 31349, State of Utah v. Gary Vance Saunderc 
and Michael Lee White was at times referred to as Case No. 
31149. White's name was stricken at some time, a fact which 
':he State could not clarify (T.172). That conviction was on 
June 21, 1978, and Mr. Saunders was commited to the prison oro 
June 29, 1978 (Exhibit 7). This exhibit was admitted over 
defense counsel's objections regarding foundation as to 
whether the person who certified it actually had custody 
of the record, whether Appellant was adequately represented 
by counsel and whether the commitment was properly authenticat 0' 
without a case number on the sheriff's receipt (T.171-73). 
Exhibit 8, Case No. 18748, State of Utah v. Gary Vance Saund..2.'· 
was admitted over defense counsel's objections as to founilat'. 
authentication of who wrote the first page and how lt becam• 
part of the record and the rpmoteness of the conviction 
(T.173-73). Appellant's convlction on that offense was ·:·rt 
11, l'Jf;4, (Exhibit 8). Furthermore, Appellant 
, , 1 pleaded guilty to the 1964 conviction only 
,,, 1,, vias f'romised probation by both his attorney 
ir,1 -1, 1 ::;t,1t.e's attorney (T.197). He stated he would not 
pleaded guilty if he had known he would go to prison 
':. l')S), The State presented no evidence that Mr. Saunders 
caJ representation or whether there was a knowing 
of counsel or his constitutional rights (T.200). 
Exhibit 9, Case No. 30202, State of Utah v. Gary 
7ance Saunders and Buddy Clark Anderson was also admitted 
in support of the State's habitual criminal charge over 
derense counsel's objections. Again there was a foundational 
''hJPet because it could not be verified that the person 
:ifhO certified the record had custody. There was a date 
,·hai-1gt.: f'rom 1977 to 1976 and there was no evidence as to 
;th"Se handwriting was on the affidavit. Furthermore, the 
'l 1 "t i OJ ·; i t stated, "of my own free will I have conferred with 
" with no name filled in (T.175-78). ----
·:curt subsequently convicted Appellant on the habitual 
·,r1 ·h0rge. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TO DENY APPELLANT'S MOTION TO 
fi PCSSESSION OF A FIREARM COUNT. 
·:i. di :ode ilnn. §77-35-9(d) (1953 as amended) provides 
nf offenses where there is a prejudicial 
-5-
effect: 
If it appe8rs that a defendant or 
the prusecution is prejudiced by 
a joinder of offenses or defendants 
in an indictment or information, or 
by a joinder for trial together, the 
Court shall order an election of 
separate trials of separate counts, 
or grant a severance of defendants, 
or provide such other relief as 
justice requires. 
In this case, Appellant was greatly prejudiced by the 
trial of the Possession of a Firearm Count with the 
Burglary and Theft charges. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the severance 
issue in State v. Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1979). 
In Gotfrey, charges of rape upon the defendant's step-
daughters and sodomy involving the step-son were 
improperly joined. The trial court's erroneous 
joinder resulted in error. In reversing 
the Court stated; 
Id. at 1328. 
The purpose of that statute is to allow 
joinder of offenses and thus eliminate 
multiple prosecutions and conserve time 
and effort when justice can best be 
served thereby. But care must be 
taken that the statute is not misused 
to deprive an accused of a fair trial. 
In State v. Mccumber, 622 P.2d 353 (1980), the 
1 •·niec Court similarly reversed convictions on two 
spxual assaults that were tried together. The 
1' neld that defendant's right to due process of law 
'):ated where the jury had heard evidence relating 
, '" se>parate offenses. The Court found that the 
nrpjudicial impact was too great where the charges were 
nnt a single criminal transaction and did not evince a 
·r,cnrr,rJn scheme or design. Id. at 356. 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals announced 
' similar position in Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 
In Drew, the Court saw judicial economy as the 
advantage of joinder of offenses. The Court noted four 
(1) the defendant could become embarrassed 
,,r have difficulty in presenting defenses; (2) the jury 
may Infer a criminal disposition and thereby prejudice 
':r'" dF·fendant; (3) the jury may view the evidence 
·1m,Jl'ltively; and (4) a prejudicial latent feeling of 
r.·s'ility may surface. Id. at 88. The Court reversed 
irtions for attempted robbery and robbery on this basis. 
Most recently, this Court held that the denial of 
r hr1 lo sever a Possession of a Firearm by a Restricted 
from an Aggravated Assault Charge did not amount 
"\"l '.r due process. State v. Studham, 655 P.2d 669 
'"he Court, however, did not address the question 
there was an abuse of discretion in denying the 
'" lPr' th" statutory terms of Utah Code Ann. §77-35-9C.dl 
-7-
(1953 as amended) as the appellant Jid not make a timely 
In this case, appellant timely moved to have the 
Possession of a Firearm count severed from the Burglary 
and Theft charges. While it may not violate due process 
of law, the appellant was clearly prejudiced by the joinder 
of these counts. The appellant did not testify. Therefore, 
no evidence of prior felony convictions was admissible on 
impeachment grounds. And yet, evidence of his status 
as an inmate of the Utah State Prison, and thus the 
obvious inference of a felony conviction, was admissible 
to prove he was a restricted person. While judicial 
economy was served by allowing one trial on all of the 
counts, appellant was denied his statutory right to a 
severance where he was prejudiced by the joinder of 
charges. Jurors, as human beings, can hardly be asked 
to accept evidence of a criminal past for one purpose 
and not to consider it when viewing the defendant and 
the case as a whole. The concerns of the Court in 
Drew v. United States, supra, were present here. There 
is no way to know whether the jury inferred a criminal 
disposition by appellant or what prejudices against 
appellant this evidence created. The policy behind 
excluding evidew:e of f"'lony c·c,nvictions unless the 
defendant testifies applies herP as well. It was an 
abuse of discretion t0 Jeny arpell8nt's motion to sever 
the counts in this 
--
POINT II 
1 WAS ERROR TO DENY APPELLANT'S MOTIONS 
r: A rn STRI AL WHEN THE JURY HEARD AND SAW 
];)ADMISSIBLE AND PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE. 
1'11cee times during the trial the jury was exposed 
1r.cid'111s \blP and prejudicial evidence. Twice a State's 
"' rPferred to multiple burglaries and thefts despite 
lo Lourt's ruling, pursuant to then Rule 55 of the Utah 
1Ps of Evidence, that such evidence was inadmissible. On 
r,,,, nccasion, an unrelated firearm was left sitting on 
desk in full view of the jury. Each incident 
and in combination, created a prejudicial impact on 
appellant's case and warranted the declaration of a mistrial. 
Prior to trial, the Court ruled that the State could 
evidence of other burglaries unless it established 
J l)Jnjatiun of materiality and gave the defense an opportunity 
)tjb'L (T.10-11). Nevertheless, the State adduced the 
ing testimony: 
Q· Did you have a conversation about the two firearms 
the television set and the microwave oven? 
;; Yeah. 
Who was participating in that conversation? 
':11,, s;:i td what in that conversation? 
'".'! me, "Well, I got to be going back to 
'1 • 'u1- r·,ny ho•Jse so I might as well take that stuff 
:1" 1 st ore it where we are storing it at." 
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Q: Did you have a regular place to store 
A: Yeah. 
Q: Where was that? 
A: My brother's. 
Q: What's his name? 
A: Timmy Shunk. 
Q: (By Mr. Housley) In this conversation that you 
had at Gary's house, did he tell you what to do 
after you got it down to the place to store it? 
A: Yes. 
Q: What did he tell you? 
A: He told me to call our fence--his name is Amos--
to see what he wanted to buy. 
Q: Amos? 
A: Yeah. 
(T.52-53). There was no foundation as to materiality and no 
chance for counsel to nbject prior to the testimony. 
the discussions at the bar, counsel for appellant twice m, 1'1' 
for a mistrial, vihich mnt ions the court denied (T. 96-?7 l · 
-lu-
ror mistrial based on the presence of an unrelated 
Lrl1larly denied (T.96). 
Th1 s Court formulated a two-part test, embodying 
• 11" fc,rmer' Utah Rules of Evidence 45 and 55, for determining 
.•1r,•·ther evidence of other crimes allegedly committed by a 
'lcfendant. should be allowed to be heard by a jury. 1 The 
f11st part of the analysis required a showing that the 
P11jence of other crimes was relevant and probative of a 
TI2teridl fact, State v. Mccardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982); 
3Late v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172 (Utah 1982); State v. Kerekes, 
P 2d 1161 (Utah 1980); State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 
""l P.2d 771 (1969). The second part of the analysis required 
that, if the evidence was relative and probative, its pro-
ha•ive value outweighed its prejudicial effect pursuant to 
tne r·e,:iuirements of the former Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of 
"iirlence. State v. Mccardell, supra. 
In Forsyth, supra, this Court defined what it meant 
the terms "relevant" and "probative". Quoting State v. Harries, 
... -··-- -· ---------
SS provided: Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a 
r .. r 0 "n ""!lrc\tt•:d a crime or evil wrong on a specified 
' .. , '', '"' inarlmissible to prove his disposition to commit 
·!vil wrong as the basis for an inference that he 
<nuther crime or civil wrong on another specified 
·.· / s11b.1ect to Rules 45 and 48, such evidence is 
·. :. 11",Ft1 to prove some other material fact 
' 1' "r.sence of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, 
.. 
1
• :r·"r,:.iration, plan, knowledge or identity. 
-11-
Any pertir,cnr fact which throws 
light qpon thP subject under 
judicial consideration, the 
accused's guilt or innocence 
of the crime for which he is 
charged is admissible. 
6LJl P. 2d at 1175. The Court also quoted State v. Scott, 111 
Utah 9, 20-21, 175 P.2d 1016, 1021-22 (1947) which stated: 
The basic rule of admissibility 
of evidence is that all evidence 
having probative value--that is, 
that tends to prove an issue is 
admissible .... 
Id. The Court held in Forsyth that evidence of investors 
other than the four victims was admissible as to false 
representations of ownership of real estate, of the amount 
being raised for development, of the number of investors, 
and of the overdue status of some of the refunds owing. 
Evidence that certain investments were not repaid was not 
admissible, but was held to be harmless error in the case. 
Subsequently, in State v. Mccardell, supra, this 
Court held that evidence of the possession of stolen checks 
from the same owner was admissible against a defendant char:;;. 
with forgery. The Court held not only that the evidence was 
relevant to and probative of the defendant's intent and 
knowledge, but also that th• protative value was not suh-
stantially outwei 1T,h' j h:; " i rejudi•:ial e'.'fect purs·.1ant ' 
Rule 45. che lat tr"" Lil l:inr in12: t e·st is the scc•:ond r:;art ,·,f ' 
analysis. 
- I -
)'1r+- has held evidence of prior crimes or 
t, inadmissible where the prejudice is too great 
", ·<rnd prong of the analysis. Evidence that the 
'0! bePn charged with a crime in the past, even 
,,,,Tl, r,,, I' t' t.r·ied on the charge, was prejudicial error in 
icY:sc,n, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1961). Test-
,,,,' 1.bout a prior arrest for a similar crime required 
10re,al in Stc1te v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d 407 (1963). 
In this case, the trial court ruled that evidence 
"'[,Pt' burglaries was inadmissible unless a foundation 
hy the State on materiality and the defense had an 
"f'f'1r'tunity to object. There is no legal issue as to which 
Jnder Rule 55 such evidence might fall under. 
' 0 11, +here is a factual issue as to whether the testimony 
tLµ gun constituted evidence of other burglaries and 
+-r:" State met its obligations pursuant to the Court's 
Ea:h statement and the gun individually, and in 
iri21 i•,n, created the obvious inference of other burglaries. 
,,,,,. r ·' Lave a "regular place" for storing stolen items 
,, r',, '11\.n is so familiar as to be "our fence" unless 
't• ; l t i crimes involved. The obvious conclusion 
j is that appellant was engaged in other 
l'}, conclusion would have been enhanced by 
'1f1 .;x '::raneous gun by the jurors. 
-13-
The State laid no foundation and the defense had 
no opportunity prior to the introduction of the testimony 
to argue the issue before the court. At no time did the 
prosecutor attempt to establish why the references to 
other burglaries was material. The statements arose during 
the course of simple inquiries as to where the items from 
this particular burglary had gone. Moreover, taken by 
surprise, defense counsel could only move for a mistrial 
without any opportunity to prevent the introduction of this 
testimony. The court's order was violated and the denials 
of the motions for mistrial were error as there was no 
probative value to the evidence and, even if there was 
any probative value, it was certainly outweighed by the 
prejudicial effect of the jury knowing other burglaries 
had been committed. 
The prejudicial effect was further exacerbated 
as the judge did not strike the witness' statement or 
instruct the jury to disregard it. Without an instruction 
of that nature, the evidence is left intact for the jurys 
consideration. State v. St. Claire, 3 Utah 2d 230, 282 
P.2d 323 (1955). Thus the jury was left to consider the key 
witness' testimony as to other unrelated alleged criminal 
acts by appellant in determining his guilt or innocence. 
The admission of the statements to the jury is 
the type of error which can be regarded as a mere irregula•' 
or of such inconsequential nature that it could not have 
-14-
r ., •. ' t•I l· 1 1 '. v, thP substant lal rights of the appellant. 
supra; State v. Siebert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 
: Consequently, the failure to declare a 
i,, 'his case was error where the logical inference of the 
·t11T.· v1;Js that the appellant was a bad person, a criminal, 
J the tPstimony served no probative purpose. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL AND THE 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE WHEN THREE JURORS 
VIEWED HIM IU SHACKLES AND PRISON CLOTHES. 
On December 29, 1982, the second day of trial, Mr. 
was brought in his prison clothes, in foot chains, 
and in handcuffs before three jurors who were waiting out in 
t•1e hallway (Supp. T.133). At that point in time, Appellant's 
"ttorney moved for a mistrial in chambers which was denied. 
In Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 48 L.Ed. 2d 1194 
11 ' EJ, the United States Supreme Court stated that a State 
compel a defendant to stand trial in identifiable prison 
clothes. Although in that case the Court held that there was no 
1 violation where defense counsel had failed to 
jt:ect, the Court viewed forcing defendant to wear prison clothes 
:w Dbrid;;ement of his fundamental rights to due process and 
"" µrotectlon of the law. The Court further stated that the 
rre L'ot1 r:!' 1 nnocence accorded to the defendant is violated 
·!' ''r'.."" r1·ison clothes. 
,, ' L•,lit to a fair trial is a fundamental 
"'t '! cc.ccured by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
1 •·· :; ion of innocence, although not 
•'· 1·1 ·111:it in the Constitution, is a basic 
·r:i1.·)n·:nt of a fair trial under our system 
'Ut i··0. 
it•.r; ·rnitted] Close judicial scrutiny is required 
-l'i-
to look at any particular procedure. However, with regard 
prison clothes, the Court stated: 
The potential effects of presenting an 
accused before the jury in prison attire 
need not, however, be measured in the abstract. 
Courts have, with few exceptions, determined 
that an accused should not be compelled to 
go to trial in prison or jail clothing because 
of the possible impairment of the presumption 
so basic to the adversary system. 
Id. at 130 [cites omitted]. 
The Utah Supreme Court has unequivocally held that & 
defendant has a right not to stand trial in prison clothes. 
In Chess v. Smith, 617 P. 2d 341 (Utah 1980), the Court reman;. 
a case on a writ of habeas corpus, stating: 
The prejudicial effect that flows from a 
appearing before a jury in identi-
fiable prison garb is not measurable, and it 
is so potentially prejudicial as to create a 
substantial risk of fundamental unfairness in 
a criminal trial. 
Id. at 344. The Utah Court has even gone so far as to requi:· 
that a judge inquire sua sponte if a defendant wishes to wale 
the right not to appear in prison clothes. 
In this case, the appellant was not in his prison 
clothes during the trial, but the prejudicial effect was the 
same. In fact, the prejudicial effect is probably sharper 
where the jurors see appellanL on the second day of trial 
the first time in prison clothes and chains. A slmtlar 
situation occurred in McKenzey v. State, 
(Georgia 1976), where a defendant was brought into the •co 11 :' 
in prison clothes and handcuffs. Although thee 1'ourt sc:iij '
1 
· 1 .t.1, 1 c: were not prejudicial in a case prosecuting 
,,,, f'r)r Ps·:etpe, it held that the defendant was denied 
J11eo t.0 the handcuffs. The Court said that, where 
11nJue security risk, the common law rule applied 
r,ndant has a right to be tried free of shackles 
fo M0ore v. State, 535 S.W. 2d 357 (Texas Criminal 
r, 1 i'! (,:, a Texas Court also reversed where the defendant 
- 1. •S:'•t lnto the courtroom handcuffed in front of the 
Court held that, especially where defendant was 
for security reasons during his murder trial, 
>tP1•• ;ias no justification for his being viewed by the jury 
fr, The defendant's constitutional right to a 
r ion of innocence was infringed by the jury seeing 
'.3h:J. kled. 
In this case, close judicial scrutiny of the potential 
f.- 1'11• p can only result in a new trial. The appellant walked 
:f elevator in prison clothes with handcuffs and ankle 
r,alr.r "'.'hree jurors were standing nearby. Up until that 
'urors had only seen the appellant in street clothes. 
•• 
1
: ' 'hP ,iur•)rs were aware that the appellant was in a 
it the time of the offense, they did not know 
1 'Jt•' •,-rcis presently in prison. 
:•c'. ·1s t!le Utah Supreme Court has noted, there 
rej11dicial effect for a jury to see a 
,, prison clothes. This is not a case 
'' ·,nt •.-nc. 4isruptive in the courtroom or on the 
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way to court or where vio.s uvt-"rwhf:'lmlng f!,iJ\lt- ft'<)m 1r-. 
other evidence. This is a case that r•·stt'd ·•n thP credit l' 
of one, and only one, witness. The appellant's right tut" 
presumed innocent and to a trial by an impartial jury mand:,1. 
that he be given a new trial where he is not paraded in fror· 
of any jurors in prison clothes and shackles. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A PRESUMPTIOil 
OF INNOCENCE AND NOT TO TESTIFY WHEN THE PROSE-
CUTOR COMMENTED ON THE FAILURE TO PROVE THE 
APPELLANT NOT GUILTY. 
In a criminal case the State has the burden of proc. 
and cannot comment on a defendant's failure to prove his 
innocence. In this case the appellant did not testify. 
only witness called by the defense was for impeachment purposo• 
The emphasis of the closing argument on the appellant's beha1 · 
was that the State had failed to meet its burden to prove 'che 
appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and yet, the 
prosecutor stated in the rebuttal part of his closing argu-
ment that the appellant had not proved his innocence. 
( T. 149). 
The first thing [that defense counsel said] 
was that the defendant is not guilty, the 
defendant did not t:his burglar:;, the 
defendant did not commit this the 
defendant did not possess these firearms 
Now, there is no proof of thclt, •,lbc••ilutel:; 
no proof of that. 
: 11 1·J··r· '.'or you to say a defendant 
t you would have to say that 
1 '11i1liiitrts is lying. You would have 
' 1 ·c1t c:t.acy Williams is not telling 
· itL :ibout his participation, about 
"'c .r•.·t1·l'lnt's participation in this case. 
11,.,,, thrt's not proof --- that's not proof 
· : .. ·J' l:•· ·iitln't do it. 
111 IriyJr. ·1. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 49 L.Ed. 2d 91, 96 
l, the United States Supreme Court held that 
c .·f'· •1 I r,• 'c vist-arrest silence cannot be used to impeach 
'r 1-
- f-- r : , 
critects the defendant's exercise of his Miranda 
Irr such circumstances, it would be fundamentally 
unrair and a deprivation of due process to allow 
tl1P arrested person's silence to be used to 
an explanation subsequently offered 
'lt t r·Lil. 
· ':,[, :3upreme Court has similarly recognized error 
;;r..:.r, '1 [ cc"··1to;o corrunents on the defendant's post-arrest 
Ir :t.ate v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 (Utah 1981), the 
''. r r' 1Jsecutor' s comments during closing argument 
to tell an officer he was an unwilling 
c:,·"·1· 1·1CJted rcbbery was reversible error. This 
.,,. ·)Lt,,s th·· defendant's right not to incriminate 
·111 ! t µI Constitution and not to give 
·.: r· 'lnder Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
-lJ-
Even more pertinent to this case, the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah 19'17), held l",, 
a prosecutor cannot comment on the defendant's failure to 
testify at trial. In his closing argument in Eaton, the 
prosecutor noted that only the defendant "really knows what 
took place" and queried "what does the defendant tell us?" 
The prosecutor continued on in his closing to state that 
the jury had never heard any evidence that a prosecuting 
witness was "out to get blacks", apparently a defense raised 
by the defendant. Id. at 1115. The Court found that such 
remarks were improper and prejudicial. In so doing, the 
Court distinguished an earlier case of State v. Kazda, 540 
P, 2d 949 (Utah 1975), where the Court had held the prosecutor' 
closing argument proper analysis of the evidence. In Kazda, 
the prosecutor had said that "the defense has presented no 
evidence as to why the defendant was out there. What was he 
doing out there?" at 950. The Court said that this was 
a comment on the total amount of evidence or lack of evidenc' 
and not an impermissible comment on the defendant's failure 
to testify. 
If is also impermissible for a prosecutor to misstat' 
the law in his closing argument. In United States v. Seg1,c, 
555 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1977), the prosecutor stated that tli-
defendant wac; presumed sane amj in essence placed the ll 1H J·ct 
on the defendant to show that he was insane. The Court n 
- 1' -
,,, J,. ['t' '!11c•·d his expert witnesses no such presumption 
"I 1 tu:.t the prosecutor then had a burden to show 
1 ,, ,,,,, beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court thus 
-'1Pr,s:''l 1 murr1Pr conviction where it concluded that the 
,,,, s,_,,,11tor ha1i misstated the law. 
In tl1 'Ls case, the prosecutor overstepped the bounds 
33ing the totality of the evidence. He misstated the 
10'1' ,,,, tr,e tiurden of proof, improperly placing a burden to 
the defendant innocent on defense counsel. This is not 
·,1st dLscussion of the analysis of the evidence or the lack 
thereof as in Kazda. As the Court in Eaton stated, it is 
irnpr,opPr fur a prosecutor to make a "thinly disguised" 
to introduce the fact that the defendant did not testify 
"nd then allow the jury to draw inferences of guilt from that 
1 lJre to testify. 569 P. 2d at 1116. In this case, the pre-
'udice obvious where the jury might then have believed that 
1-h" '1f1pel lant had a burden to prove that he was not guilty. 
leprived him of his fundamental right to a fair and 
ial Jury verdict and to his right not to give evidence 
·c'.-r.•t him,•plf in any trial. 
POINT V 
11 WA, TO SENTENCE APPELLANT UNDER 
1 if7,1,-,- li!1K111JhL CRIMINAL STATUTE. 
,1, i l ,_:riminal statute under which Appellant 
lo apply the principle of proportionality 
'•,. Amendment's proscription of cruel and 
unusual punishment. Further, the admission of documentary 
evidence of two prior guilty pleas without proper foundatic, 
violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 
of the Utah Constitution where the evidence did not show 
that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily entered those plNs. 
A. SENTENCING APPELLANT UNDER UTAH'S HABITUAL 
CRIMINAL STATUTE CONSTITUTES CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. 
Utah's habitual criminal statute which provides 
sentencing in cases where there have been two prior felony 
convictions and commitments is unconstitutional as applied 
to him. Because the statute makes no distinctions between 
property offenses and offenses involving violence, it fails 
to meet the first prong of the test set forth in Solem v. 
103 S.Ct. 3001 (1983). 
In Solem v. Helms, the Supreme Court held that a 
proportionality review prevented imposition of a 1 ife sent enc: 
without possibility of parole under South Dakota's recidivist 
statute where the petitioner had six prior felony convictions. 
The Court announced objective factors to consider in 
sentences. First, courts should be guided by the gravity of 
the offense and the harshness of the penalty. Second, sentui 
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction may J. 
for comparison. Third, sentences imposed for the same offPr,:· 
in other jurisdictions may provide guidance. Id. at 
.. 
,,,, ,11 t:;•Jns can be made in light of the harm caused 
,t 0r to society. Id. The magnitude of the crime 
trnlµfu l comparison as does the culpability of the 
l I. Al though the Court in Helms struck down the 
lire without possibility of parole, the application 
s:oportianality review analysis should prevent sentencing 
Utah's less stringent habitual criminal statute. Utah 
,je Ann. §76-8-1001 (1953 as amended) provides for a sentence 
•. fi·re years to life for the habitual offender. 
This Court recently reviewed Utah's habitual 
·rirnin•r: statute in State v. Montague, 671 P. 2d 187 
:•1tah J'ci,'l3). This Court announced Utah's policy is to punish 
rather than attempt to reform them. In 
lJzing the statute, this Court left open the question of 
•,L ·:on0tit1,tionality of the statute under an Eighth Amendment 
review. 
Appellant's prior felony convictions were all property 
• 1 In looking at the gravity of the offense and the 
i·srJnr-o.ss Gf the penalty, this Court should compare property 
c. 
assault, . r L3 r-S IJ serious and violent crimes such as 
As the Court noted in Helms, "nonviolent 
:,,,., :•:eorious than crimes marked by violence or the 
r n'F·." Id. at 3011. 
i,; s TJtah' s statute constitutes cruel and 
:, c, r r,r CJ.s applied. Appellant received the most 
n' th,c. state could impose for any crime short 
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of a capital offense. Helms similarly received the most ,. • 
punishment South Dakota could impose on any criminal for ::r 
crime. Id. at 3013. Like Helms, Appellant's record shows r, 
instances of violence. Id. n. 22. 
In Helms, the Supreme Court noted lack of incent\·". 
for rehabilitation under such recidivist sentencing. Clearl.i' 
Utah's statute discourages most incentives for rehabilitatiofi 
of property offenders. The imposition of the sentence under 
the habitual criminal statute was an unconstitutional punishm" 
where the penalty is so disproportionate to other violent 
recidivist offenders. 
B. IT WAS ERROR TO ALLOW ADMISSION OF GUILTY 
PLEAS WITHOUT PROPER FOUNDATION TO DETERMINE 
IF THE PLEAS WERE VOLUNTARILY MADE AND 
WHETHER APPELLANT HAD ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION. 
In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969), the 
Supreme Court stated, "[a] dmissibili ty of a confession must 
be based on a reliable determination of the voluntariness Jssc: 
which satisfies the constitutional rights of the defendant." 
After Boykin courts could no longer presume waivers of the pr\·.•' 
against self-incrimination, the right to a trial by jury, or 
the right to confront one's accusers where the record is siltn: 
Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1967) similarly starci 
the waiver of the right to c<rnnsel coulrJ not bp pr•c2°'l1T1e•J f•'· 
a silent record. The Supreme Court reversed a 
Burgett where evidence of a prior con·.Jiction wlth nr, ir:Ji· 
in the record that counsel had been wa 1 ved rr·a•'h"' j t Jir· jur.:' 
r, , 1,et it ioner was not convicted under recidivist statute 
·ir<t'r: lire was charged. IQ_,_ at 112-13. 
In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), the 
·ill 1.1,•Jt t hPld that a guilty plea was invalid where the trial 
';dge ra1led tu personally inquire of the defendant whether he 
c0jerstond the charges and the consequences of the plea. The 
,,,., rejected imposing the burden on the State of demonstrating 
r,0ru the record that the plea was voluntarily and knowingly 
•nter2J in favor of setting aside the plea where Rule 11 of the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure 2 was not strictly complied 
viit''· Although McCarthy was based on the Federal rules, the 
18nguage suggests the defendant must be informed of the nature 
cf the charges and the consequences of the plea for a plea to 
At trial, Appellant's attorney objected to admission 
tl1e affidavit from the 1976 conviction on the basis no 
was listed. "It says 'of my own free will I 
·onferred with my attorney, '--"(T.178). Furthermore, 
Arnellant argues his guilty plea under the 1964 conviction was 
"''Jlunlarily entered: 
Q· (By Ms. Carter) Why did you enter it? 
A I was promised by the District Attorney 
·ry lnwyer that I would get probation. 
r,rth the rights the defendant must be advised 
'·' i·J a plea. 
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Q: And what happened to you? 
A: I was committed to the Utah State Prison 
Q: If you had known that was going to happen, 
would that have changed what you had done? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And what would you have done if you would 
have known that? 
A: I would have pled not guilty. 
(T.198). Specifically, Appellant's attorney asked him 
he was ever read or asked whether he knew he would not have a 
trial in the case and of what he was advised. Appellant repL 
"[Nlo, it was in the judge's chambers. Just, 'Do you plead 
guilty?' I said, 'Yes."' (T.200). The record clearly indicat': 
the standards of Boykin v. Alabama, Burgett v. Texas, and McC; __ 
v. Unites States were not met in the present case. 
In this case Appellant has demonstrated his lack of 
understanding or knowledge of the consequences of entering " 
guilty plea or the rights he waived. Admission of the affid3 
without adequate foundation denied Appellant's due process 
Therefore, the habitual criminal conviction based upon a canst:· 
tionally infirm plea should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's convictions should be reversed and 
new trial granted. It was unfair to Appellant to refuse ' 
the count alleging possessi'_'n of a firParm sl1ould hav,:· 
severed; the motion timPly madP and the count's jolndPr 
unfairly prejudiced Apor1 
crrl r· l:i 1 when inadmissible evidence of other crimes 
·J v-, u·,e jury. These errors were further compounded 
:1",·' 11F1s seen by three jurors in shackles. The 
·.r ·-''·')made improper, prejudicial comments to the jury 
r Appellant had not proved. Finally, the habitual 
·ur,a l statute as applied to property offenders is unconsti-
:onJ l ly •:ruP 1 and unusual punishment. Appellant's conviction 
1· r st:citute was further infirm as there was no adequate 
laid for the pleas on two of the three convictions. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant seeks to 
r,a;e t•Js convictions reversed and a new trial ordered. 
fJATED this day of April, 1984. 
Respectfully submitted, 
iNDAE: CARTER 
Attorney for Appellant 
• 
1 E:LIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney 
- l's Offir'.e, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, 
"tc;r-_ this __ ·_ day of April, 1984. 
,1'. 
I t?r' Ji;,', /)\ 
/ 
-27-
